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PUBLIC RUSES
James E. Krier*& ChristopherSerkin"
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859

The public use requirement of eminent domain law may be working its
way back into the United States Constitution. To be sure, the words "public
use" appear in the document-and in many state constitutions as well, but the
federal provision applies to the states in any event-as one of the Fifth
Amendment's limitations on the government's inherent power to take private
property against the will of its owners. (The other limitation is that "just
compensation" must be paid, of which more later.) Any taking of private
property, the text suggests, must be for public use. Those words, however,
have amounted to virtually nothing for over fifty years, thanks to a line of
United States Supreme Court decisions giving unfettered deference to
legislativejudgments about what a public use might be. In Berman v. Parker,'
for example, the Court held that when Congress selects eminent domain as the
means to accomplish some legitimate public end, the taking is presumed to be
for a public use "in terms well-nigh conclusive."' The facts in Berman
suggest just how strained this reading of the public use limitation is, at least
in terms of ordinary meaning. The project upheld in the case used eminent
domain to condemn slum property and thereafter sell it to private
entrepreneurs for redevelopment.' Owners of the condemned lots complained
that this made "the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of
another businessman," 4 a taking for a private rather than a public use. But the
Court disagreed, holding that the words "public use" don't mean what they
say, they mean "public purpose," and clearing blighted land is that.' The
Court took the same approach thirty years later in HawaiiHousingAuthority
v. Midkiff,6 where the condemnation action aimed at an alleged land oligopoly,
not blight.7

* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For their
comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Gregory Alexander, Richard Epstein, Lee Ann
Fennell, and colleagues participating in a faculty lunch talk at the University of Michigan Law
School.
** Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law.
1. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
2. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
3. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-31.
4. Id. at 33.
5. Id. at 33-34.
6. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
7. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984).
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The highest courts of many states have followed Berman and Midkiff
with respect to the public use requirement in their own constitutions. Perhaps
the leading example is the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Poletown
8
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, approving Detroit's plan to
condemn a residential neighborhood, clear it, and convey it to General Motors
as a site for an assembly plant.9 Unlike the situation in Berman, the land in
question was not blighted, but the court nevertheless deferred to the legislative
judgment that the project, by giving a boost to the area's strained economy,
would meet a public need, thus serve a public purpose, thus amount to a public
use." "The benefit to a private interest," the court said of this deal for
General Motors, "is merely incidental.""
Given a half century or more of decisions like these, it's easy to
understand the lament that the public use limitation had come to amount to
nothing. 2 Yet suddenly-and just why is a question we leave aside here-signs
of life have appeared, thanks to two recent cases, County of Wayne v.
4
Hathcock3 and Kelo v. City of New London. The cases converged in terms
of their facts-both arose from government programs to condemn unblighted
land and convey it to private parties for development-but diverged in terms
of their holdings. In Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its
earlier decision in Poletownand took a new approach to the question of public
use. 5 In Kelo the Connecticut Supreme Court followed the conventional
deferential view and upheld the program in question. Perhaps because of this
sharp conflict, the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari
in the Kelo case.' 6 So, however unexpectedly, the subject of public use is
back on the table, with a good chance of substantial change in the law across
the country. Our aim here is to consider several paths that sensible reform
might take, and select from them one that we regard, at least tentatively, as
superior.

8. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
9. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,457 (Mich.
by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
overruled
1981),
10. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 61 (1986) ("[M]ost observers today think the public use limitation is a dead letter");
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161

(1985) ("To judge from the cases and the scholarship on the subject, this chapter [on public use]
deals with an empty question.").
13. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
14. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
15. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770, 788 (Mich. 2004).
16. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004) (granting certiorari).
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I. BETWEEN PUBLIC USES AND NAKED TRANSFERS

Whenever the government selects eminent domain to accomplish its
purposes, the means- condemnation-is a constant, whereas, of course, the
ends to which condemned property are put can vary considerably. The
variation of interest here has to do with the degree to which the property taken
from private owners is made available to the public at large. Looking at
matters from this perspective, we can imagine a continuum. At one extreme
are instances where the property is subsequently put to a use that is open, in
the most literal sense, to everybody. These we can rightly call public uses.
At the opposite extreme are instances where the property ends up in private
hands, the public is excluded, and there is no pretense of some indirect public
benefit. These we can rightly call naked transfers. Figure 1 provides an
illustration; its purpose is merely to capture two kinds of easy cases insofar
as the public use issue is concerned.

I

I

Public Uses

Naked Transfers

Fig. I
Consider three examples. In example one, the government tries to buy
several privately owned lots well situated as a site for a post office, and,
having failed, seeks to take the property by eminent domain, clear the lots, and
build the post office. The purpose of building a post office is an appropriate
government end and the post office itself is a classic (and a literal) public
use-owned and operated by the government, open to the public, and so forth.
Condemnation is appropriate, provided just compensation is paid.
Now move to naked transfers at the opposite end of the continuum.
Suppose as example two that the government wants to buy and clear the same
land as in example one, but not in order to build a post office. Instead, the
plan is to build a mansion for the CEO of a big corporation, simply in
recognition of his being the CEO of a big corporation. Not by any stretch, of
course, would this pass any version of public use scrutiny, not even scrutiny
of the most wretchedly deferential sort. In any event, the naked transfer to the
CEO would seem to be an inappropriate exercise of the police power, lacking
any conceivable relationship to public health, safety, welfare, or morals.'7
17. Notice, however, that line-drawing problems can arise even in instances similar to
our extreme example. Aiming to induce a new employer to move to town, as in Kelo, a
municipality might offer an enticing package that includes tax incentives, improvements in
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But what of programs in between the extremes of public uses and naked
transfers? Suppose, as example three, that the government, after negotiations
with the CEO of the big corporation mentioned in example two, proposes to
condemn a large number of residential properties in a perfectly fine middleclass neighborhood, tear down the houses, clear the land, and transfer the
nicely assembled parcel to the big corporation to keep it in the area, this in the
hope that the corporation's presence will help lift a sinking economy. Here
there is little question that the end in mind is within the police power, and this
on one view determines the public use issue as well. As Justice O'Connor put
the point in her decision for the Court in Midkiff, "[t]he 'public use'
requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police

powers.""
Some have read this statement as a startling evisceration of all Fifth
Amendment limitations on the power of eminent domain, including the
compensation requirement. As Thomas Merrill has argued:
Legitimately exercised, the police power requires no compensation. Thus, if public
use is truly coterminous with the police power, a state could freely choose between
compensation and noncompensation any time its actions served a "public use." This
19
doctrine in a single stroke.
approach would seemingly overrule the entire takings

Actually, however, Merrill's parade of horribles doesn't follow. Suppose that
public use is truly "coterminous with the police power," as Merrill puts it.

The Fifth Amendment's taking provision would then be read to say nor shall
private property be taken pursuant to the police power, without just
compensation. Obviously, compensation would still be required so long as
there is a taking-that is, condemnation through eminent domain. So treating
public use as coterminous with the police power doesn't do away with takings

infrastructure, re-zoning, and the condemnation of land. E.g., James Surowiecki, It Pays to
Stay, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 2004, at 40. If some portion of the condemned land is to be
used as a site for expensive new housing for the senior executives of the company, should this
item move a reviewing court to kill the municipality's plan as an abuse of the police power?
Generally speaking, the question has to do with framing the constitutional inquiry. Is judicial
review to proceed on the package as a whole, or rather on an item-by-item basis whereby courts
would exercise what amounts to line-item-veto power over redevelopment projects? For an
interesting look at framing constitutional inquiries in other contexts, see Daryl J. Levinson,
Framing Transactionsin ConstitutionalLaw, I ll YALE L.J. 1311 (2002). William Fischel also
points out the difficulties of distinguishing between non-public and public uses in his
contribution to this symposium. See William A. Fischel, The PoliticalEconomy of Public Use
in Poletown: How FederalGrants EncourageExcessive Use ofEminent Domain, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 929.
18. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
19. Merrill, supra note 12, at 70; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 176 (1995).
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doctrine; rather, it seems to have done away with serious judicial scrutiny of
the public use question. As we have seen, most courts defer to legislative
judgments in this regard with the same abandon that characterizes their
deference to legislative judgments about economic regulation pursuant to the
police power. Yet that seems worrisome in the case of government programs
like those in our example three, and in Hathcock and Kelo, all of which
involve forced transfers from some private owners to other private owners.
Precisely because these kinds of programs might not involve any literal uses
by the public at large, they smack of something other than what they announce
themselves to be. Recall that in Poletown, involving a transfer to General
Motors, the court said of the government's plan that "[t]he benefit to a private
interest is merely incidental."2 Perhaps, but with private-to-private transfers
there is always the danger that it is the benefit to the public interest that's
merely incidental, that the underlying program is, in short, a ruse. The
question is how courts might guard against this possibility.
II. PUBLIC RUSES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: Two CONVENTIONAL
APPROACHES

To date, courts unwilling to defer on the issue of public use have
employed one of two approaches, each of which has also been noted or
suggested in the scholarly literature. The first of these is the categorical
approach and the second is close scrutiny (strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and so on). As we shall see, each has its problems, which will lead
us to suggest an unconventional alternative.
The categorical approach. At its narrowest, this method of judicial
review takes the words "public use" literally, meaning "actual use or right to
use of the condemned property by the public ... ,,2" A more expansive but
still categorical approach is illustrated by the Michigan Supreme Court's
decision in Hathcock, involving Wayne County's plan to condemn unblighted
land adjacent to Detroit Metropolitan Airport and transfer it to private parties
for the purpose of developing a business and technology park with a
conference center, hotel, and recreational facility-all this with the purpose of
stimulating the local economy." The court held that transfer of condemned
land to private parties is appropriate as a public use only (1) where 'public
necessity of the extreme sort"' requires eminent domain to assemble land on
behalf of enterprises generating public benefits (for example, rights of way for
20.

Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.

21.

Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain,57 OR. L. REV.

203, 205 (1978).
22.

Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770-71.
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railroads and highways); (2) where the condemned property "remains subject
to public oversight after transfer" (for example, it is transferred to a regulated
public utility); or (3) where the condemned property is taken not in the interest
of private parties to whom it is transferred, but rather "because of 'facts of
23
independent public significance"' (for example, to clear blighted land). The
court ruled that the Wayne County project met none of the criteria.
Close scrutiny. In Berman, the Court equated public use with public
purpose and reviewed the legislative judgment in terms of the very
undemanding rational basis test.24 In contrast, some state courts refuse to
regard purpose and use as indistinguishable and, notwithstanding a clear
public purpose, take a close look at the government's reasons for using the
25
power of eminent domain to achieve its ends. The thrust of the approach is
to insist that the government show a public benefit resulting from eminent
6
domain that cannot be achieved by some less intrusive means.
Problems. Any level ofjudicial scrutiny beyond the little required by the
rational basis test suffers, of course, from one familiar problem-that courts
might end up substituting their own judgments for those of legislative bodies.
Close scrutiny amounts to courts taking a second look and making a second
guess, and an ultimate judgment finding no public use, however wellintentioned, could be wrong from the standpoint of sensible policy or
constitutional doctrine. The most important point, however, is not judicial
error but its consequences-which, in the case of heightened scrutiny, are
binary in nature, in that the government project is approved or it is not, with
no option in between for cases close to the line. Courts operating under this
approach have only a clumsy set of alternatives at their disposal. They can
strike down the contested government action, but this creates high costs if a
court gets it wrong. To be sure, the government may, in the event it loses in
court, revamp its program and try again, but that process can be protracted and
difficult and likely lead to further litigation. Difficulties like these may

23. Hathcock, 304 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)). llya Somin has criticized these categories on a variety of grounds. See generally
Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005. For a related categorical
approach to the public use issue, see EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 169-81 (arguing that the public
use test should be considered satisfied only in the case of programs to provide pure public
goods, or where there is universal access to the condemned property after conveyance, as with
common carriers, or where eminent domain is necessary to assemble land and the resulting
surplus is fairly divided).
24. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32.
25. See, e.g., S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (111.2002).
26. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "DespoticPower" be Tamed? Reconsidering
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 17 PROB. & PROP. 30, 36 (2003).
Public
the
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actually increase judicial reluctance to find violations of the public use
requirement, thus increasing costs in the other direction as well-allowing too
many government programs to go forward with impunity, despite the lack of
significant public benefits.
The categorical approach to the public use question suffers this same allor-nothing difficulty and gives rise to another as well. The approach invites
the government to behave strategically and take ill-advised steps for no good
purpose other than to fit its undertaking into one of the relevant categories.
For example, the business and technology park at issue in Hathcock might
well have satisfied the Michigan Supreme Court's criteria provided only that
it were actually owned and operated by the government itself. Most likely,
though, private enterprise would do a better job, meaning the court's
methodology could end up imposing unnecessary costs on the public at large.
III. AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC RUSES: ADJUSTED
COMPENSATION

Consider the second constitutional limitation on the government's power
to take property against the will of its owners-namely, that condemnees must
be awarded just compensation. Given this, why should owners care about the
meaning and application of the public use requirement, since they are paid for
what's taken in any event? Each of them, the Court said in Olson v. United
States, "is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property
had not been taken."27 Owners, then, should quite literally be indifferent, yet
they are not.
The reason is plain: As the Court explained some forty-five years after
Olson, the principle of indemnity announced in that case
has not been given its full and literal force. Because of serious practical difficulties
in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given time, we
have recognized the need for a relatively objective working rule. The Court therefore
has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee's loss.
Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive "what awilling buyer would pay
28
in cash to a willing seller" at the time of the taking.

27. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (citation omitted). This is not to
suggest that indemnification needs to be, or should be, the goal ofjust compensation. Indeed,
one of us has previously argued that compensation can serve fundamentally different goals,
depending on how the substantive constitutional rights at stake are identified. See Christopher
Serkin, The Meaningof Value: Assessing Just CompensationforRegulatory Takings, 99 Nw.
U. L. REv. 679 (forthcoming 2005).
28. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506,511(1979) (citations omitted)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
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The difficulty, of course, is that in condemnation cases the sellers are not
willing at all, however eager the buyers happen to be. They are unwilling
precisely because, absent some statutory provision, they are not compensated
for moving expenses, loss of goodwill, consequential damages, nor, most
importantly, loss of consumer surplus-which is to say the amount by which
an owner values property over and above its fair market value. 29 That amount,
especially significant in the case of residential property, has to be positive, for
otherwise owners would already have sold their holdings on the market.
There are three lessons to be taken from cases like United States v.
564.54 Acres ofLand. The first, acknowledged by the Court in its opinion, is
that fair market value results in systematic under-compensation from the
property owner's perspective, which explains why owners are not indifferent
to the public use issue.3" The second is that the measure ofjust compensation
3
is purely a matter of judge-made law; nothing in the Constitution defines it.
The third, less apparent, is that courts can use their power to alter the measure
of compensation as a means to guard against public ruses.
Begin with the observation that the shortfall of fair market value will
generally be at its smallest in the case of classic public uses, precisely because
the benefits so clearly accrue to the public at large (and not to private interests
for their own sake) in such forms as access and services. In turn, these
benefits provide some amount of implicit compensation to the erstwhile
owners whose property has been taken to enable the government project in
question." To be sure, condemnees are still worse off relative to all the rest
of the public who realize the benefits of the same government project but
retain their property as well. Over time, however, imbalances should even out
as those whose property is taken in one round for one public use are later
benefitted by other public uses subsidized by condemnation of other private
property.33

29. Lee Anne Fennell has identified this as part of what she calls the "uncompensated
increment." Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957.
30. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 506-07. It may not be under-compensation, however,
from the perspective of sound policy, distributive justice, or other important interests. See
Serkin, supra note 27 ("Criticisms about the adequacy of compensation have too often elided
the difficult prior question, 'adequate for what?"').
31. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
32. Our discussion of implicit compensation grows to some degree on arguments
presented in EPSTEIN, supra note 12, chs. 12 & 14. See also Frank 1. Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness:Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "Just Compensation "Law, 80

HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1223 (1967) (suggesting the compensation requirement be relaxed "when
there are visible reciprocities of burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to that for which

compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other people").
33. Cf Fennell, supra note 29, at 987 ("If the overall system delivers results that are

Spring]

Public Ruses

There are plenty of opportunities to refine this insight to take account of
different interests. If, for example, government burdens disproportionately
fall on particular groups, additional compensation may be necessary to
preserve horizontal equity, perhaps by adding bonuses aimed at making up, in
a rough and ready way, for loss of goodwill, consumer surplus, and so on.34
The list of concerns implicated by just compensation is long and
heterogenous, and compensation can look very different when geared toward
one versus another.35 As a first pass, however, we think that compensation
awards based on fair market value, plus the implicit benefits of true public
uses, come close, at least, to what the Fifth Amendment generally demands.
Notice, though, that as we move away from classic public uses and in the
direction ofnaked transfers, implicit compensation of the sort discussed above
will decline (to zero in an extreme case like our example two discussed
earlier). Condemnation for such non-public uses gives rise to concerns with
fairness and efficiency alike.3" We therefore envision an approach by which
just compensation is adjusted upwards in specific ways as the use of
condemned property moves from classic public use to possible public ruse to
naked transfer.37
Adjusted compensation could range from the current fair market value
standard, to an adjusted measure to make up for the absence of implicit inkind benefits in public ruses, to a different adjusted measure based on the
both efficient and distributively acceptable, then we might hypothesize that landowners are
receiving back from the system enough in-kind benefits to make up for the burdens that the
system imposes on them.").
34. The idea of bonuses based on some percentage of fair market value is commonly
suggested in the literature, and is put to work in some countries. See, e.g., TAKING
LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND REGULATION IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES 31 (Tsuyoshi
Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 2002); JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ I C. 1I [3] (rev. 3d ed. 2004). Other opportunities to increase compensation are described by
Serkin, supra note 27.
35. Fennell, for example, has proposed an interesting three-dimensional approach to
identifying particular public use concerns. See generally Fennell, supra note 29. Wherever
substantive lines are drawn in this area, our view is that compensation is the appropriate place
to turn for a remedy.
36. On efficiency and fairness in the context of condemnation, see, e.g., Michael A.
Heller& James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law ofTakings, 112 HARV.L. REV.
997, 998-99 (1999).
37. Some commentators have considered and rejected increased compensation for nonpublic uses. See Fischel, supra note 17, at 950-53; Fennell, supra note 29, at 992. Others, too,
have at least acknowledged the possibility of adjusting compensation, but without any
grounding in existing takings doctrine. See EPSTEIN, supranote 12, at 174-75 (describing 150%
compensation under the Nineteenth Century Mill Acts); Merrill, supra note 12, at 86-87
(discussing EPSTEIN, supra note 12); see also Richard Epstein, Look at DamagesFirst, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 27, 2004, at 27 (describing the importance of damages in public use cases).
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ultimate transferee's gains. As to the two adjusted measures, neither would
require legislative action or constitutional reform. Figure 2 describes the
range of possibilities. We have already discussed fair market value, and shall
consider the two adjusted measures now.38

I
Public Uses
Limited fair market value

I
Public Ruses
Compensation for
loss of implicit,
in-kind benefits

I
Naked Transfers
Gain-based
compensation

Fig. 2

Compensationfor Loss ofImplicit, In-Kind Benefits. The middle of our
spectrum would consist largely of programs that transfer condemned property
to private parties. Such programs entail giveaways but might also result in
improvements (such as shopping centers) more or less accessible to the
general public. In addition, there might be various sorts of diffused economic
benefits as the private transferee of condemned property puts it to uses which,
this is the hope, revitalize the local or state economy. Condemnees can end
up doubly disadvantaged in these situations: Not only has their property been
taken against their will in exchange for an unsatisfactory price, they might
also be precluded from sharing in some or all of the economic gains created
by the government action.
The Kelo case provides a good example,judging from the facts described
in the opinion. There, the perennially distressed City of New London created
a development plan to complement a new global research facility that Pfizer
was building in the area. New London's expressed goal was to "create jobs,
increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to ...the city's
waterfront, and eventually 'build momentum' for the revitalization of the rest
of the city, including its downtown area."3 9 In short, the government
anticipated increased tax revenue, increased employment, and ultimately
increased property values as New London became more well-to-do and a more
desirable place to live. Its mechanism for achieving this prosperity, however,
was to transfer property from one private individual to another, based on
nothing more than an attempt to put the property to a more profitable use.

38. We are proposing one possible range of compensation solutions to the public use
question. There may be others that are more or less well suited to addressing different
substantive concerns, but we leave an exploration of those alternatives for another day.
39. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509.
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When New London condemned property to achieve these goals, it not only
expropriated the property itself, but may also have taken (and will certainly
have compromised) the erstwhile owners' opportunities to share in New
London's newfound prosperity. After all, they received compensation in
amounts below the value they put on their property; in addition, if the
government project does revitalize the local economy, real estate prices will
go up in a way that traditional compensation for the condemnation will not
reflect.
So the situation in Kelo puts a mean twist on the Supreme Court's
observation in Armstrong v. United States that the requirement of just
compensation "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."4 ° The decision in Kelo permits the government to
do that and more by denying to a small group ofproperty owners benefits that,
in fairness, should be granted to everyone. Where the putative public benefit
is both general and economic-as in Kelo and most other condemn-andretransfer cases-we propose valuing the condemned property using
projections about the economic benefits of the government action instead of
using the economic conditions as they actually exist at the time the
government takes the property. In effect, this will permit condemnees to share
in the economic benefits the community expects to receive. This approach has
an additional advantage, too. Because governments themselves would
(through higher condemnation awards) bear the costs of undue optimism about
the benefits of their programs, there would be incentives to make realistic
assessments."
Note finally that our proposal is not as radical as it might seem. Despite
blackletter law to the effect that condemned property is to be valued as of the
date of taking, there is considerably more discretion in the timing of valuation
than courts explicitly acknowledge.4 It is, in fact, commonplace for courts to
employ a variety of techniques to increase compensation as of the date of the
condemnation to account for any diminution of value resulting from the mere
threat of a government action, overcoming what is commonly referred to as

40. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
41. This suggestion responds directly to Somin's observation that current eminent
domain practices build in incentives for governments to overestimate economic benefits. See
Somin, supra note 23, at 1011.
42. For a more comprehensive discussion of this timing issue, see Serkin, supra note
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condemnation blight.43 We are simply proposing rolling the compensation
date forward instead of backward.
Relatedly, federal courts have crafted rules to withhold from condemnees
any increases in property value attributable to the government's action. For
example, in acquiring property piecemeal for a single project, the government
need not pay higher compensation for later-acquired property if the increase
in value owed to the earlier condemnation activity, and the subsequent
condemnation was within the scope of the original project.44 Just as an
exception sometimes proves the rule, this "scope of the project" rule proves
how easy it would be to achieve its opposite. It would not be a significant
change in approach for courts to hold, within a range of public ruses, that
condemnees should share in the value created through condemnation.
Gain-BasedCompensation. The more government actions move in the
direction of naked transfers, the less likely that the programs in question will
provide any tangible public benefits-no increases in property values in which
condemnees can share by way of adjusted condemnation awards, no in-kind
benefits by which true public uses confer some measure of implicit
compensation. For these cases we need a different way of adjusting
compensation, and gain-based awards look like a suitable candidate. Not only
would they give appropriate compensation to condemnees, they would also
provide a good test for government claims that taking from Peter to give to
Paul will, by some sort of magic, actually advance the public weal.
Suppose a case where the government uses its power of eminent domain
to assemble separately owned parcels of land to be transferred later to some
private party (eminent domain is important in such instances because it
sidesteps the holdouts and high transaction costs that commonly make land
assembly by voluntary means so difficult45 ). Assembling property should
create a surplus, because the value of each individual parcel is likely less than
its value as part of a larger whole put together by the government. The

43. See Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?,
48 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 765, 778 (1973) (arguing that courts should compensate for the
decrease in value due to the threat of agovernment action); see also Vaizburd v. United States,
384 F.3d 1278, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (manipulating date of the valuation to account for
some diminution of value prior to the date of the actual expropriation); City of Buffalo v. J.W.
Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1971) (finding defacto taking as of earlier date); United
States v. 38,994 Net Usable Square Feet of Space, No. 87 C 8569, 1989 WL 152806, at *2
(N.D. III. Nov. 21, 1989) (including information about actual losses suffered by the property
owner after the date of the condemnation).
44. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse, Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,
477-78 (1973).
45. Assembly by eminent domain gives rise to the majority of public use challenges.
See Merrill, supra note 12, at 98.

Spring]

Public Ruses

question, of course, is how the assembly surplus is to be shared among all
concerned parties-condemnees, the government, and private transferees.
Under current compensation rules, condemnees get nothing; all of the surplus
goes to the government or the ultimate transferee. Changing the rule so as to
distribute some or all of the surplus to condemnees would create more robust
protection against questionable projects.46 Moreover, forcing the government
to disgorge the surplus should decrease its incentive to condemn property in
the first place.47
Gain-based compensation does not aim to put condemnees in the
position they would have occupied but for the government action. Its purpose,
rather, is to prevent the government from benefitting by assembling property
for transfer to private parties. Accordingly, gain-based compensation gives
condemnees awards based on the value their property would have had if they
had been able to hold out for the anticipated gains of the condemnation.48 In
a very real sense, this has the effect of giving to the condemnees the value to
be realized through the government's condemnation power. The remedy is a
strong one, though not the equivalent of the injunctive relief that would follow
were the court to adopt an all-or-nothing approach to public use. The
government retains the ability to assemble parcels through the power of
eminent domain, and thus to facilitate value-maximizing exchanges,
notwithstanding that the immediate benefits of those exchanges go to the
condemnees.
If condemnation of land for transfer to private parties were simply a
matter of bilateral exchange between the government and the class of
burdened property owners, then gain-based awards would remove the
government's incentive to use the power of eminent domain altogether.
(Thomas Merrill has rejected the idea of a gain-based award at least partly on

46. As rights-remedies literature has observed, the content of a right is coextensive with
the remedy for its violation. See generallyDaryl J. Levinson, Rights EssentialismandRemedial
Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (examining the relationship between rights and
remedies across constitutional law).
47. One caveat is in order. We are discussing here only those cases in which the
government action does, in fact, create some surplus. Where this is not true, and the property
retransferred to a private party is put to less valuable use, an alternative to gain-based
compensation would be needed. We leave aside that possibility here, but acknowledge an
interesting discussion of possible solutions in HANOCHDAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY
OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC VALUES 21 (1997) (suggesting, in the restitution context, awards
based on the higher of harm or gain).
48. Although Fennell does not ultimately propose a gain-based award, part of her
"uncompensated increment" includes the closely related value to property owners of being able
to bargain for a share of the surplus created by the transaction. Fennell, supra note 29, at 96566.
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these grounds. 49 ) In fact, however, the condemn-and-retransfer cases involve
tri-lateral exchanges, with the government acting as intermediary.
Importantly, the price the government must pay the condemnees is not
necessarily the same as the price the government then charges the subsequent
transferee. The government may still have an incentive to condemn and
retransfer property if the other benefits it generates outweigh the costs of
paying the full assembly surplus to the condemnees. A simplified example
should demonstrate how this works, and also point out the appeal of a gainbased compensation regime.
Imagine five adjacent properties, each valued individually at $100,000.
The government aims to condemn the land and transfer it to a developer for
a new shopping mall. Once assembled for the mall, the property will be worth
$1,000,000 (or $200,000 per parcel). This program looks close to being a
naked-transfer, but the government mightjustify it because it will increase tax
revenue, employment, and perhaps even the availability of commercial
services for an under-served neighborhood. With gain-based compensation,
the government would have to pay $200,000 for each condemned lot, rather
than the $100,000 current fair market value. This doesn't mean, however, that
the government has to charge the developer (the ultimate transferee) the full
$1,000,000.5o Indeed, if the government tried to do that, the developer would
be unlikely to undertake the project at all. The question facing the
government, then, is whether there exists a bargaining range in which the
benefits from the expressed purpose of the condemnation-taxes, employment,
and services for the under-served-are sufficient to make up for any shortfall
in the sale price to the condemnee. If, for example, the ultimate transferee
was willing to pay $900,000 for the $1,000,000 worth of assembled property,
the government would then have to decide whether the new shopping center
would generate over $100,000 worth of the sort of public benefits it cited as
reasons to go forth with its project in the first place. If it turns out the
bargaining range is insufficient, this indicates that the project's benefits
weren't all the government claimed them to be, in which case it should be
scrapped in any event. In short, compensation based on the transferee's
ultimate gain is a way to test the government's claims about the public
benefits of its project.5

49.

Merrill, supra note 12, at 85 ("In the case of profit-oriented entities, however,

restitution could eliminate the use of eminent domain altogether.").
50. In Poletown, for example, the City of Detroit paid almost $200 million for property
it retransferred to General Motors for only $8 million. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 469.
51.

While there is no guarantee that subjective harms will not be higher still than this

gain-based award, the point here is not to indemnify against any loss but instead to transfer the
value of the government's condemnation power to property owners, both to increase
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Implementing gain-based awards would also require relatively little
change in current law. Despite occasional pronouncements to the contrary,
the idea of restitutionary recovery is familiar in condemnation, as well as in
takings doctrine generally. While the Supreme Court recently announced that
takings are to be valued by the net harm to the property owner,52 a competing
line of cases values the government's gain instead of the property owner's
harm. 3 Though the latter cases usually arise in the context of limiting
property owners' recovery to the extent of the government's gain, they
nevertheless provide doctrinal footing for the gain-based approach. At
present, property is valued for purposes of compensation by reference to its
highest and best use, other than the use anticipated by the condemning
authority.54 As the United States Department of Justice's appraisal standards
for condemnation explain, "The use to which the government will put the
property after it has been acquired is, as a general rule, an improper highest
and best use."55 Altering the highest and best use standard to include the
ultimate use of the property by the transferee would effectively give
condemnees the gains created by the condemnation.
IV. FROM PROPERTY RULES TO LIABILITY RULES

By way of conclusion, we should note what some readers have no doubt
seen for themselves, that our approach to the public use question exploits the
distinction between property rules and liability rules introduced by Calabresi
and Melamed some years ago.56 So-called property rules protect rights holders
with a veto power, whereas liability rules protect them with damages.
Eminent domain provides a classic example of the distinction." If A wants to
buy B's house, he has to negotiate with B and meet B's price in order to close
a deal-unless, of course, A is the government and wants B's property for a
public use. In that event, A can force a sale, at a price determined not byB but
by a court. So in the ordinary case, B's right to his house is protected by a

compensation and to test the government's claim of public benefits.
52. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
53. E.g. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282
(1943); Francini v. Town of Farmington, 557 F. Supp. 151, 157 (D. Conn. 1982); Whitney
Benefits, Inc., v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 407 (1984).
54. Merrill, supra note 12, at 83 & n.75.
55.

INTERAGENCY LAND ACQUISITION CONF., UNIF. APPRAISAL STANDARDS FOR FED.

LAND ACQUISITIONS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/land-ack/datapart3.htm (last

visited Jan. 22, 2005).
56. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules. Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).

57.

Id. at 1106-08.
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property rule, whereas in the case of the government as the buyer, it is
protected by a liability rule. The reasons for the limited protection in the
second instance are familiar: Given that condemnation often aims at the
purchase of many properties for purposes of some large government project,
the government's ability to proceed by voluntary purchase is impeded by the
high costs of transacting with so many parties, in particular parties seeking to
hold out for all the surplus (and more!) that might result from the
government's action.
It must pay
The government's power is limited, of course.
compensation; it may take only for public uses. Notice, though, that while
compensation entails protection only by way of a liability rule, the public use
requirement has to date been enforced by a property rule. If a court concludes
that a taking is not for a public use, then the government action is enjoined and
the government is forced to deal, if it wishes to go forth with its plans, with
each buyer on each buyer's own terms. The likely result in most cases is
stalemate, thanks to the problem of holdouts.
No wonder courts have so often deferred to the government's will, given
these consequences. They must fear the costs of error on their part, should
they kill a project that might in fact be worthwhile. But deference results in
error as well, just in the opposite direction. Public ruses go forth,
notwithstanding questionable benefits and inadequate compensation.
So to avoid the clumsy all-or-nothing property rule approaches to public
use-whether deference, a categorical approach, or closer scrutiny-together
with their high error costs, we propose a shift to liability rules, with
compensation increasing as skepticism about the public nature and benefits of
government action grows.58 We discussed some recognized measures of
adjusted compensation that courts could use to implement our approach, but
they are merely suggestions or illustrations. Alternatives are available.59 The

58. Fennell has suggested that higher compensation raises the possibilityofopportunist
rent-seeking by property owners. See Fennell, supra note 29, at 978. While we acknowledge
this possibility, it strikes us as the least grave of the various dangers facing possible solutions
to the public use question. In fact, adjusting compensation responds directly to the premise of
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), preventing courts from second-guessing legislative
judgments while still mitigating the unfairness resulting from non-public uses.
59. See Serkin, supra note 27 (describing stress points in existing compensation
doctrine that skew compensation either higher or lower, such as allocating development risks
to the government in computing property's highest and best use, narrowly drawing the line
around both the benefit offset test and permissible but unenacted regulations, adjusting the
timing of valuation to account for compensation blight, recharacterizing the nature of the
property taken, and awarding replacement value). All of these mechanisms, alone or in
combination, could be used to approximate the sorts of compensation we have proposed,
without requiring any change in existing law.
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short of it is that the government should be able to proceed in any
condemnation action the ends of which are within the police power, provided
only that it pays the appropriate price.

